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SLICING DEFAMATION
by Yonathan Arbel
Slices and Lumps is a recipe book for thinking. Using a deceptively simple
analytical framework, the book showcases the power of conceptualizing the world
through the prism of "slices" and "lumps." As Professor Fennell shows, the level of
granularity of legal rights and duties-how lumpy they are-can have a marked
impact on behavior, which presents another lever for policymakers to pull. Through
dozens of examples and discussions, this book provides a vivid illustration of how
much insight can be gained by thinking about longstanding problems as problems of
optimizing their "lumpiness." In this short contribution, I will follow the book's
recipe and offer a quasi-policy proposal, quasi-thought-experiment in some of my
areas of interest: contracts and torts.
Even at a high level of abstraction, conceptualizing torts and contracts through the
prism of slices and lumps reveals important differences. Tort law tends to be
lumpy-either the pedestrian was trespassing or not; either the driver was
negligent or not; either the factory polluted or not-whereas contract law offers an
almost limitless granularity. Indeed, contract law's ideology is of the freedom to
assemble rights and duties from a broad and minimally restrictive menu of options.
Consequently, where torts scholars wield a hammer with which they bang on social
nails, contracts scholars grip a scalpel. Against this background, I develop here the
idea that the tort doctrine of defamation law is too "lumpy" and that defamation law
would better achieve its goals if it were "sliced" by contract law. While space
limitations prevent me from making the case in full and addressing many possible
objections, I hope to dissect enough aspects to motivate a detailed investigation of
this idea.
But first, let me motivate my inquiry with the story of Mel Mermelstein. The year is
1980, and the then 54-year-old Auschwitz survivor encountered a public
advertisement from the Institute for Historical Review (IHR)-a hate organization
o-perati-na under a pseudo-academ is. In the ad, the IHR denied the fact that
the Nazis used gas to murder Jews and other minorities. To clothe its message with
credibility, the IHR offered a prize of $50,000 to whomever could bring contrary
evidence. Mermelstein, who witnessed first-hand the horrors of the Nazi genocidal
machine, did exactly that. He approached the IHR with evidence and demanded
that it pay for the false assertion. Not to anyone's surprise, the IHR refused to pay.
Mermelstein brought a _awsuit in 1983; the IHR lost and settled for a payment of
$90,000 and an issuance of an apology. This outcome tarnished any claim to
credibility the IHR had. And while they did not stop making inflammatory
statements, the absence of similar financial offers is quite palpable.
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In the Mermelstein case, defamation law was mostly irrelevant, as it does not
protect groups. For precisely this reason, however, Mermelstein's story carries
interesting lessons for defamation doctrine. We see here, for one thing, how the fact
that the statement was not actionable created a credibility problem. Cheap talk is
empty talk: It is hard to establish credibility when there is no penalty for lying. This
alludes to defamation's law greatest, yet underappreciated, benefit: Iending
credibilityto speech. It also demonstrates how there are incentives to bridge this
gap-to create liability privately when the law fails to do so for the parties-and
that private parties may assume potential liability voluntarily. And finally, it shows
how credibility is bought at the price of falsification-you can only build credibility
by exposing your statement o verification and repercussions. Here, Mermlestein's
response vindicated the truth and helped expunge the veneer of respectability the
IHR claimed.
These lessons are timely, as large reforms to defamation law are on the horizon. To
understand this future, remember the past: defamation law started as a common-
law protection for the reputation of victims of false derogatory speech. The doctrine
protected victims through three channels: (1) the deterrent effect of defamation law;
(2) redress in case of injury; and (3) vindication of truth in a public forum. In the
seminal case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that
reputation-protection must be balanced against the free speech rights of potential
speakers, especially when statements concern public figures. This decision and its
progeny led to an environment where media outlets receive broad, although not
unqualified, protection from defamation. Recent calls, however, seek to upend this
longstanding balance. While the national conversation became embroiled in debates
over fake news, Justice Thomas has expressed an intention to revisit New York
Times v. Sullivan, a new defamation Restatement was announced, and President
Trump has continuoul called to expand defamation laws:
We are going to take a strong look at our country's libel laws, so that when
somebody says something that is false and defamatory about someone, that
person will have meaningful recourse in our courts.
Expanding defamation law will exact a price. Strict defamation laws mean tighter
regulation by the courts of speech and the press, the inevitable chilling of free
speech, and, some argue, amplification of the harmful effect of fake news. Given
these threats, it is pressing to evaluate whether there are alternative means of
confronting concerns of fake reporting and false allegations without jeopardizing
free speech, free press, or liberty.
Thinking through the prism of lumps and slices helps us to see a better way
forward: Defamation by contract. I propose here the application and development of
a legal tool called "Truth Bounty," which will allow parties to slice defamation law's
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current tort liability. A truth bounty is a device, not unlike the one used by the IHR,
which allows journals and journalists to stipulate a reward, as a bond, to any
member of the public who can substantially falsify a story, in accordance with
established procedures and standards of proof. Critically, the truth bounty will
come in addition to whatever liabilities the media has under existing defamation
law and is meant only to replace the proposals to expand media liability through
tort liability.
The implementation of truth bounties is designed to be as simple and
straightforward as possible. Taking a cue from the UCC and the Incoterms, who use
abbreviated notation as a shorthand for complex procedural arrangements, the
procedure of a truth bounty can be triggered by the simple "T.B." and the dollar
amount that is at stake. So, for example, next to the story about a corrupt politician,
a short notation can be appended "T.B. $50,000"; as the following figure (featured in
the case, Klentzman v. Brady) illustrates. This notation will be enough to trigger
the bounty and allow any member of the public who can disprove the story to claim
the $50,000 prize
uty rady's tape collect n
ed "Roadside Suppression"
By providing such bounties, journals can garner credibility and, thus, readership,
distinguishing themselves from unreliable sources. In some sense, the bounty is
akin to a contractual warranty, but rather than a warranty of the washer's engine,
it is a warranty of truth. The choice of the bounty itself will be at the discretion of
the editor and will depend on a combination of the confidence they have in the story
and its sources and commercial factors. Of course, some journals may only post a
nominal bounty, which might seem, at first blush, as a loophole. Suspend, for a
moment, the disbelief in truth bounties and imagine a social equilibrium where
bounties are commonplace. When an editor decides to "deviate" from this
equilibrium by posting a low bounty, it looks bad. It immediately alerts the
audience that this story is likely bogus, badly researched, or tentative. The
deviation, then, comes at a palpable price-to the story, the editor, and the journal.
And even if the editor of, say, a tabloid is willing to pay this price and runs the story
with a nominal bounty, the audience is on high alert that this story is dubious. This
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takes most of the sting from the publication, leaving the victim's reputation largely
intact-all of that without even filing a lawsuit.
Are truth bounties realistic? Would journals and editors have an incentive to post
truth-bounties? For the most part, the answer seems positive. This may strike some
as counterintuitive- why would any publication risk legal-financial liability
voluntarily? But the reality is that under defamation law, media outlets are already
assuming (some) legal risk for every publication (some more than others), if it pans
out as false. Worse, the tort imposes an especially costly liability because of the
inherent uncertainty of the victim's provable harms in court. When the NY Times
runs a story about an alleged sexual predator, for example, it is very difficult to
anticipate the victim's recovery-how much business he will lose, what emotional
harm he will suffer, etc. This uncertainty is compounded by the regular use of
additional punitive damages in this domain. This means that, if found liable, the
journal may have to pay millions in compensation. Yet, despite these costs, media
outlets regularly publish stories. Interviews with reporters and editors reveal that
editors value credibility greatly and, in fact, censor many stories today to avoid loss
of reputation. Truth bounties allow reporters to garner credibility and exposes them
to a bespoke and known risk of liability.
What is the social case for truth bounties? Truth bounties are, first and foremost, a
signaling device. The journal has private information about the reliability of any
given story, which is a function of the number of sources consulted, the sources'
reliability, the rigor of the editorial process, the private motivations of sources to
share information, the story's timing, among other factors. While there are many
ways in which a journal can communicate its confidence in its stories, there is no
more time-honored tradition than putting one's money where one's mouth is.
Admittedly, even under tort liability, one signals confidence by running a story, as
doing so exposes one to liability. The difference is not in signaling per se; both the
crow and the nightingale can sing. It is the quality of the signal that makes all the
difference. By slicing the truth bounty, the journal can tailor its degree of confidence
to the specific story, thus harmonizing the signal and the editor's confidence in it.
And here is another reason to like truth bounties: they crowdsource the search for
truth. Under truth bounties, every member of the audience can claim the prize by
disproving the allegation. Often, it will be the victim herself who would be in the
best position to claim the bounty, for she will have private information of her
innocence. But sometimes, it will be others who will have better access to relevant
evidence. If the story alleges that a person committed a crime in Indiana, a store
clerk may be able to provide an alibi from the store camera in Mississippi; or if the
story alleges that an actor sexually harassed the camerawoman, she might be able
to show that they had a consensual relationship. By awarding the bounty to any
member of the public who can substantially disprove the story, we encourage the
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public to share private information and help with the search for truth. While the
target may not receive compensation the way she does under current law, truth
bounties protect the victims in three ways that are in some ways stronger. First,
when a bounty is claimed and this fact is advertised, then the victim's name will be
vindicated. Second, she can gain access to vindicating information she might not
otherwise have. While some witnesses may share evidence voluntarily, many
remain passive; the incentive created by truth bounties may propel them to come
forward. Third, the incentive to wrongfully defame in the first place, given these
two considerations, will be diminished.
Truth bounties would also encourage the publication of more stories. If we were to
expand liability through lumpy tort liability, every story will expose the paper to a
risk of liability of unknown value. The journal will run a story only if the benefits
exceed this lumpy cost. This means that on the margin there are some stories that
would have been published, had the level of liability been slightly lower. As Fennell
notes, "Lumpier choices render intermediate alternatives unavailable and thereby
force parties to all-or-nothing (or lump-or-nothing) decisions"-the journal is limited
to choosing between publishing a report and assuming all liability or abandoning it
altogether. True, publishing these marginal stories means publishing stories that
are less reliable than others. To some, this would be a benefit; stories about
powerful people like Harvey Weinstein have been floating for a long time but were
never published. An earlier publication of these rumors may have been helpful in
bringing an end to a series of sexual assaults. Others, however, might worry that
such stories could significantly harm their subjects. This concern is assuaged,
although not eliminated, by the observation that the harm to victims is lower under
a 'slicey' system than it would be under an expanded lumpy tort one. The tort
liability is very lumpy, making any published story even more credible because the
magnitude of liability is larger. For these stories that would be published, the
victim is actually better off under a low truth bounty than under a lumpy tort
liability.
But perhaps the most compelling argument for defamation by contract is the
argument against defamation by torts. Inasmuch as the policy alternative is the
expansion of defamation laws to include media outlets, this expansion will come at a
palpable price to the freedom of the press. England, for comparison, adopted a strict
defamation law. It has since been shunned by many publishers who worry that
publishing there would lead victims to engage in libel tourism-forum shopping for
favorable defamation laws. This chilling effect on publishing is a real cost to the
marketplace of ideas and basic freedoms alike. Expanded tort liability puts a special
strain on smaller outlets and investigative reporting, as it imposes a very lumpy
cost on them. Expanding defamation law across the board, as is now proposed,
would prove considerably more onerous than truth bounties, with worrisome
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anticompetitive effects on smaller outlets. In this, then, the voluntary use of truth
bounties can expand accountability without jeopardizing the freedom of the press.
And, at the risk of exhausting the reader's patience, here are two final reasons to
care about truth bounties. A world where truth bounties are common, as alluded
before, is a world with a clear separating equilibrium between high-quality and low-
quality journals. That is, it will be easier to distinguish real, valuable reportive
journalism from other forms of infotainment. And, if the truth bounties procedures
include an escrow account, bonds, or insurance, they can also overcome the
judgment-proof problem associated with "shallow-pocket" journals.
If truth bounties are all that, why is it that we don't see them used more often? A
leading reason is enforceability. Professor Daniel O'Gorman recently examined with
great attention the enforceability of a special kind of contracts-the 'prove me
wrong' contracts-which are very similar to truth bounties. Under these
agreements, the offeror is offering a payment to any person who can prove them
wrong; one familiar example being the Carbolic Smoke Ball case, where a prize of
£100 was promised to whomever could prove wrong the seller's advertisement hat
directed use of their esoteric drug would prevent the flu. A lady contracted the flu
despite following the seller's instructions and then brought a successful awsuit.
O'Gorman believes that, in general, such cases fail to satisfy the consideration
requirement, for the offeror does not derive any benefit from being proven wrong.
While in the Carbolic case one could argue that the seller was selling some kind of
warranty, the case for consideration is more difficult with truth bounties-as these
can be claimed by any member of the public, even if they did not purchase the
newspaper or relied to any extent on the truth bounty. Now, I would resist the idea
that the consideration tail should wag the contractual dog. I also don't think that
the inducement test under the bargain theory should at all be concerned with
whether the induced action is a benefit conferred upon the promise. Suffice it, in my
view, that it is objectively determinable that the promise was meant to induce
action or at lea t ajromie of action.
In any event, there is a more substantial enforceability hurdle, as demonstrated by
the odd case of Kolodzie]_v. Mason. A defense attorney appeared on TV and argued
that his client couldn't have traveled from the location of his last sighting to the
scene of the grisly murder within the time available to him. In making this claim,
the lawyer added "I challenge anybody to show me-I'll pay them a million dollars if
they can do it." An entrepreneuring law student (who else?) took the challenge. He
replicated the trip and showed that it could be done in time. But the lawyer refused
to pay, and the case was litigated. The judge ruled that there was no contract as the
lawyer's statement was indefinite and hyperbolic, comparable-the judge
explained-to stating "I'll be a monkey's uncle." And so, the judge refused to enforce
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a relied-upon proposal, made by a lawyer on national television, that contained both
a price and detailed offer of service.
While Kolodziej does not bar the possibility of agreements that would meet this high
enforceability threshold, it does make it more costly and uncertain. Daniel Hemel
and Ariel Porat highlight how such costs can easily be prohibitive, as beyond
formalizing the offer, the offeror also needs to design relevant procedures for the
refutation process-for example, the standard of proof, judge, and choice of law-
and then educate the public about them. They also identify another cost of offering
a prove-me-wrong contract: It just doesn't feel right. It appears that making such
offers sometimes violates a social norm and makes the offeror appear crass or tone-
deaf to social conventions. Hemel and Porat bring the example of presidential
candidate Mitt Romney, who appeared out of touch when, in a public debate, he
offered to pay $10,000 to Rick Perry if the latter could prove his allegation that
Romney supported a nationwide health insurance mandate.
How can we implement truth bounties and slice tort liability? The challenges just
presented hold the key. What would be imperative is the creation of an off-the-shelf,
turnkey solution, that journals could use at a low cost and courts would reliably
enforce. Doing so requires little infrastructure and it can be legislated into existence
or even introduced to the new Restatement project, as a voluntary option. The use of
designated code word, such as T.B. or Truth Bounty solves a few problems
simultaneously. It is not an expression, so it will be easy to verify intent. This
should give courts the confidence necessary to enforce these agreements. The use of
special language invokes not just a general commitment to pay, but also,
willingness to be bound by the specific procedures the truth bounty institution
entails. For reasons explored shortly, it will not take long to educate the public on
the meaning of this special term. Finally, the conciseness of the term makes its
invocation simple, unequivocal, and cheap in terms of print real-estate.
The procedures involved in claiming the bounty should be standardized and
carefully developed. Some questions of choice of forum (and in particular, litigation
or arbitration), choice of law, standard of proof, escrow, division of bounty among
multiple claimants, and so on must be thoroughly analyzed in a way that space does
not permit here. In particular, we should think about the necessary level of proof to
disprove a story and how retractions (or bounty claims) should be advertised.
However, I suggest hat none of these issues present an insurmountable challenge;
many of the procedures used to prove defamation in courts today can be adopted
and a broad range of alternatives would achieve the goals of truth bounties. After
creating this instrument, the goal would be to promote its adoption. With a widely
adopted truth bounty norm, it will be difficult for journals to deviate without
disclosing their lack of confidence.
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But getting journals to adopt this policy is admittedly difficult and presents some
first-mover problems. Still, if the alternative is the mandatory expansion of libel
laws, at least the major outlets can be encouraged to set the standard by example,
leading to a cascading effect. Another challenge consists of educating the public on
the meaning of truth bounties. But this, too, does not appear very difficult. Libel
stories tend to be high profile and seeing that media outlets have an incentive to
advertise their reliability, much of the message can be trusted to disseminate
organically.
Whether or not I was able to persuade in the viability and desirability of truth
bounties, I hope I was able to show that thinking on what we can slice and what we
can lump can generate new ideas. Tort law offers a very lumpy protection,
consisting of the full scope of the victim's harms. If one is found to have been
negligent, committed trespass, or made a libelous statement, tort law would force
her to bear the full scope of her victim's damages. Such a protection is not
objectionable, perhaps, when the entitlement is a classic property right; but it runs
into unanticipated problems when there are third party effects. In particular, in
defamation law, audiences draw inferences and assign credences based, in part, on
the legal consequences of sharing falsehoods. Using a lumpy tort-approach makes
certain statements appear more credible than they should be, and others less so.
Facilitating the use of truth bounties is a method of slicing this lumpy tort liability
and allowing media outlets to more effectively communicate with their audience,
while limiting the harmful effect of speculative stories. Fennell's conceptual
framework directs attention to such basic architectural choices we make in the law.
"Because a linear relationship between inputs and outcomes is often simply
assumed without comment in economic analysis, developing a mental habit of
asking 'what if the effects are nonlinear?' can often transform the conversation." At
the very least, truth bounties are an exercise in implementing this powerful mental
habit.
Yonathan Arbel is an Assistant Professor Law at the University of Alabama.
